Re-Conceiving  Third World  Legitimate Governance Struggles in Our Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism by Okafor, Obiora Chinedu
Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 
Volume 6 Article 1 
9-1-2000 
Re-Conceiving "Third World" Legitimate Governance Struggles in 
Our Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism 
Obiora Chinedu Okafor 
Harvard Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Obiora C. Okafor, Re-Conceiving "Third World" Legitimate Governance Struggles in Our Time: Emergent 
Imperatives for Rights Activism, 6 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2000). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr/vol6/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Human Rights Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
RE-CONCEIVING "THIRD WORLD"
LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE STRUGGLES IN
OUR TIME: EMERGENT IMPERATIVES
FOR RIGHTS ACTIVISM
Obiora Chinedu Okafor*
"External involvement with the processes of state forma-
tion, particularly in the Third World, has been present for a
long time ... However, categorisation as a distinct variant
of state formation appears justified, given the extent to
which various forms of external, that is, international pre-
occupation with the internal policy frameworks and the
structuring of political processes in formally independent
Third World countries have come to be concentrated and
made concrete in recent years."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite some differences in the conceptual frameworks and meth-
odologies that guide the contemporary struggles for legitimate governance
that rage within most of the states that constitute the so-called "third
world", nearly all of these struggles seem to be rooted in fundamental as-
sumptions about three basic characteristics of governance. These character-
istics are:
(a) the scope/content of local governance in contemporary
third world states (i.e. the size of the portion of a state's
* Currently Visiting Fellow, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School; As-
sistant Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; and
SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow on Peace and Security in a Changing World.
I would like to thank Obijiofor Aginam, Antony Anghie, Brenna Bhandar,
Bhupinder S. Chimni, James Gathii, Ivan Head, Ikechi Mgbeoji, Karin Mickelson,
Makau wa Mutua, Celestine Nyamu, and Bibhas Vaze for the many different ways
in which they knowingly or otherwise helped shape the arguments presented in this
paper. I bear full responsibility, however, for the thoughts expressed herein, warts
and all. I should also like to thank the Social Science Research Council of the USA
and John D. and Catherine T. McArthur Foundation for the generous funding that
has helped make this paper possible.
1 Martin Doombos, State Formation Processes Under External Supervision: Re-
flections on 'Good Governance', in AID AND POLICAL CONDITIONALITY, 377 (0.
Stokke, ed., 1995)(emphasis added).
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governance pie that is effectively available for domestic, as
opposed to external, controP);
(b) the relative location(s) of governance (i.e. the relative
location(s) of the principal site(s) of real decision-making
as regards issues that affect the lives of the peoples of the
"third world" state in question);
(c) the imperatives for the strategies and tactics of the
movements for legitimate governance in "third world"
states imposed by (a) and (b) above.
Going by the pre-dominant and preferred theoretical approaches,
strategies, and points of focus, it appears that many of these movements for
legitimate governance in "third world" states are inadequately cognizant of
the basic reality of "third world" governance as we enter this new millen-
nium. Nearly all of these movements seem to imagine that the location(s)
and site(s) of major "third world" policy-making (what I shall henceforth
refer to as "framework governance") remains internal to the particular
"third world" state(s) with which they are engaged. It is not therefore sur-
prising, that nearly every one of these movements seems to be far too do-
mestic-centered to effectively grapple with the changing nature, location(s),
and faces of "third world" governance in our increasingly "globalising"
3
world. However, this is not to say that these movements are not completely
unaware of the limitations of a domestic-centred agenda of resistance in a
globalising and international political economy. Many of them now target a
number of international institutions as the sites where the framework gov-
ernance of their states are now more or less located.4 Thus, when the do-
2 In this connection, it is important to distinguish the exercise of "control" over
decision-making from the mere taking of "action" regarding the issue(s) at hand. In
the first case, the person or institution involved exercises imperative authority over
the decision-making process. In the second case, the person or institution involved
is merely involved in implementing decisions that have already been made.
3 On the nature of globalisation, see OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 10-11(Oxford University Press, 1995).
For critical reviews of this report, see also R. Falk, Liberalism at the Global Level:
The Last of the Independent Commissions? 24 MILLENNIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL STUDIES 563 (1995); C. Prager, The New World Order: Global
Neighbourhood or Ethnic Cleansing Zone? 102 QUEEN'S Q. 930, (1995).
4 See, e.g., the recent policy meeting between the leaders of the Nigerian Labour
Congress (NLC) (the umbrella association of Nigerian trade unions), led by their
president Adams Oshiomhole, with an IMF advance team preparatory to another
meeting between the NLC and the Managing Director of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), Michel Camdessus. During that meeting the NLC demanded that
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mestic policies and practices they seek to influence or resist are increasingly
being mandated by powerful international or external entities, these move-
ments continue to devote far too little of their energies to the processes of
seeking to influence or resist the policies and practices of these international
or external entities.
The poverty of this conceptual and practical stance is easily illus-
trated. For instance, if the major portion of the framework "governance
pie ' 5 available to a particular "third world" state has been largely acquired
by an entity that is external to that state (be it a supranational institution, a
TNC, or a superpower state), and that external entity authors the framework
decisions that constitute the bulk of the governance pie, the relative loca-
tion of the governance and decision-making relevant to that state inevitably
shift in favour of the acting external force.
In this way, the relative framework governance re-locates to the
space occupied by that force. In that instance as well, the strategies adopted
by those who seek to resist effectively the scourge of illegitimate govern-
ance in the relevant state, must invariably alter in ways that reflect the
changing face(s) and location(s) of governance regarding that "third world"
state. For is not an entity that exercises control over a major portion of a
state's framework governance in fact the major repository of framework
governance power in the relevant state? Does not the identity of the reposi-
tory of framework governance dictate the relative location of framework
governance, in such a way that if the reins of framework governance in a
given state do in fact fall substantially into the hands of external entities, the
location of such governance will reflect this external control of the reins of
framework governance? Again, must not the location of framework govern-
ance dictate the sites and locations where resistance to that specific form of
governance would be most effective? And must not the strategies adopted
for such campaigns of resistance also reflect the nature, scope, and location,
of the specific forms of framework governance against which resistance is
mounted? Strategic questions such as there are significant because if its
strategies are not re-authored to reflect the real nature and location(s) of
governance in the relevant state, a movement that seems to secure legiti-
mate governance in a given state runs the obvious risk of focusing on the
wrong targets, and thereby reducing the likelihood of its speedy success.
the "IMF should be more worker-friendly" and not focus on imposing on the gov-
emnment the presumed need for cuts in the "salary and emoluments" of Nigerian
workers. See NIGERIAN VANGUARD, (Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www. afbis.com/van-
guard/n517399.html>.
5 My reference to a state's "governance pie" refers to the totality and entirety of
the regulatory/decision-making function of the relevant state.
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This is a mistake that most movements cannot afford because as they have
devastating impacts on the everyday lives of the "third world" peoples who
would otherwise greatly benefit from its success.
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual success or failure of re-
sistance to illegitimate governance in a particular "third world" state would
to a large extent depend quite heavily on the accuracy of the understandings
of the actual nature and location(s) of framework and other modes of gov-
ernance in that state that is shared by the members of its "movement for the
enthronement of legitimate governance". 6 Put differently, success may
largely rest on the relative veracity of underlying assumptions about the
extent to which decision-making regarding that state's policies and prac-
tices is local, the identity(s) and relative location(s) of the major site(s) of
governance, and the appropriateness of an overly domestic-centred struggle
in the face of the increasing re-location of the state's broad policy-making
process to sites that are external to that state.
However, this does not imply a zero-sum equation in which frame-
work governance is in nature either exclusively "here" or "there": either
entirely domestic or external. Governance is relational, and so is govern-
ance in "third world" states. What is firmly implied is a vision and imagina-
tion that does not reify or fetishize local sites of framework or other forms
of governance as the inevitable, invariable, and inexorable location(s) of
framework governance. Rather it urges a conception of governance that
deeply accounts for the increasing externalisation and internationalisation
of governance.
Accordingly this work will critically examine the deep structure of
governance in the contemporary "third world" (i.e. the question of the rela-
tive appropriation of "third world" framework governance by entities exter-
nal to the third world) and muse on the implications of this deep structure
for the conceptual frameworks and methodologies7thus far favoured by con-
6 Hereinafter referred to as "the movement".
7 I have chosen the plural form here in recognition of the relative diversity of
"third world" struggles for legitimate governance, a diversity that ought to be cele-
brated. Yet I am also aware of the deep connection and resonance that is more often
than not experienced by most "third world" scholars and activists engaged in the
prosecution of such governance struggles when they listen to each other and when
they read each other's work. In this connection, I am in complete agreement with
Professor Karin Mickelson's characterisation of these diverse "third world" voices
as often merging into:
"a distinctive voice, or, more accurately, a chorus of voices that
blend, though not always harmoniously, in attempting to make
heard a common set of concerns."
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temporary movements for legitimate governance in "third world" states. In
particular the deep structure of contemporary "third world" framework gov-
ernance in the context of the globalising nature of our contemporary and
future international political economy8 will be demonstrated by showing:
(a) as we begin the new millennium the deep structure of
"third world" governance is not just being re-authored, it is
altering in an increasingly fundamental way;
(b) for good or for bad, these changes, involve a highly
significant increase in the pace and quality of the relative
re-location of the framework governance of "third world"
states to entities that are external to these states;
(c) a recognition of this demonstrable externalisation of
"third world" framework governance in our time imposes
an imperative on the ways in which otherwise domesticated
struggles for legitimate governance, and otherwise domesti-
cated resistance to illegitimate governance, are most effec-
tively conceptualised and conducted;
(d) this imperative re-conception of struggles for legitimate
governance in the "third world" ought to involve a relative
re-apportionment of more of the resources and energies de-
voted to such struggles in ways that acknowledge and fac-
tor in the fact of the relative re-location of "third world"
framework governance to places external;
(e) if these relatively re-located "third world" struggles for
legitimate governance are to have an enhanced chance of
bearing regular fruits, those who lead such struggles must
also re-conceptualise and re-stock much of their strategic
and tactical repertoire. They must do so in order to reflect
adequately the fundamentally changing nature of govern-
ance and resistance in "third world" states.
To clarify, the present argument does not imply a call for a hurried
de-centering of local/domestic "third world" struggles for legitimate gov-
ernance. To be sure, such local struggles must remain central to the project
Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal
Discourse 16 Wis. Irr'L L.J. 353, 360 (1998).
8 For further insight into this context, see J.H. Mittelman, Rethinking the Interna-
tional Division of Labour in the Context of Globalisation 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 273
(1995).
6 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 6
of rights activists. 9 What is being urged is a devotion of much more activist
attention, energy, and resources to campaigns that aim at influencing signif-
icantly the external entities and processes that, without any real accountabil-
ity to anyone in the "third world" so profoundly affect the lives and rights
of "third world," peoples. This, is in the end a call for cautious participation
as opposed to isolation; a call on the movement to re-orient itself so as to
have a chance of influencing the external sites where the decisions they
seek to shape are really made.
In pursuit of these stated objectives, I have organised the rest of the
chapter into four major sections. In section II of the chapter, I shall examine
the nature of the framework governance pie in "third world" states. I shall
ask the important question, to wit: after powerful external entities such as
the International Monetary Organisation (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)
have partaken of that governance pie, what is left for third world states-the
core or the crumbs? In section III, I shall examine the connected question of
the relative location of "third world" governance today, and the appropriate-
ness of the domestic terrain as the primary site of "third world" legitimate
governance struggles. The section will conclude with a brief exposition of
the lessons that are suggested by the previous analysis. Section IV will be
devoted to the question of strategy: to what extent have contemporary "third
world" legitimate governance struggles been based on accurate interpreta-
tions of the deep structure of "third world" governance in our time; to what
extent have such struggles been based on an accurate appreciation of the
relative location of "third world" framework governance? How can the
strategies that have been favoured by such movements be modified or al-
tered in order to make them more viable and more in keeping with the
reality of the emergent global legal framework and political economy? The
paper will be concluded in its fifth section. In Section V, I summarise the
major issues raised in the chapter, briefly present the major arguments that
were offered in connection with each of these issues, and consider the pos-
sibilities for a more effective struggle for legitimate governance in post-
20th century "third world" states.
H. RE-CONCEIVING THE DEEP STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE IN
CONTEMPORARY "THIRD WORLD" STATES
The fundamental question raised in considering the nature of gov-
ernance in contemporary "third world" states concerns the extent to which
9 See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Post-Cold War Reflections on the Study of Interna-
tional Human Rights, 236 ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Joel H. Rosenthal,
ed., 1995).
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local struggles for legitimate governance have are reduced to struggles
merely focusing on participation in the shaping of what remains of national
framework governance after "the master(s)"of the international policy-mak-
ing process'0 have partaken of the relevant national framework governance
pie? To what extent have such struggles been reduced to important, but
ultimately very marginal battles over who ought to participate in the shap-
ing of more or less minor or subsidiary aspects of a "third world" state's
policy-making function? To what extent are these struggles, as they should
be, central battles over the control of the more crucial broad policy-making
(i.e. framework governance) powers otherwise vested in the relevant state?
An examination of the relevant mainstream literature reveals a
striking paradox. Despite the incessant (yet relatively accurate) references
in the mainstream literature to the rapid factual globalisation of human soci-
ety in our time", and the changing face of state sovereignty 12, a striking
failure of (re)cognition still permeates the literature regarding the inexora-
ble consequences of such global re-ordering for the ability of "third world"
peoples in particular to achieve and maintain any kind of effective control
over the governance of their lives. It is all-too-often implicitly assumed in
the same body of literature that the decline of the more absolutist concep-
tions of the nature of state sovereignty has had the same kind of impact in
all kinds of states, without noting the unequal and much more significant
impact it has had on the potential capacity of the weaker states of the "third
world" to govern their own affairs. 13 In this way the impact of globalisation
on "third world" states been equated with the relatively minor impact that
globalisation has had and can have on the capacity of the more powerful
states to ultimately regulate their own affairs. 14 Accordingly, most main-
stream accounts of the relative triumph of globalisation almost invariably
fail to recognise that this grossly unequal world, the march toward global-
isation has yielded a deep and steady erosion of most state's capacity of
most of these states for self-governance; resulting increased appropriation
10 This term refers to those institutions and states that dominate the international
policy-making and policy implementation process.
1i My agnostic acceptance of the notion that various segments of our globe are in
fact becoming ever more-interdependent does not imply my embrace of the idea
that the triumph of "globalisation", especially in its present form, is inevitable, or is
the only path to human "progress".
12 On the changing face of state sovereignty in our time, see, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES
AND ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH IN-
TERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
13 See OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD, supra note 3.
14 Id.
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of the larger and more important portions of framework governance pies by
external entities. Much of this literature also fails to explicitly recognise
that the erosion of the capacity of "third world" states for self-regulation
and self-governance has crucial implications for the nature of the struggle
for legitimate governance in these often severely disadvantaged areas of the
world.
For instance, being rooted primarily in Liberal Democratic ideals,
the right of popular participation in, and control of soci-economic and polit-
ical governance, 15 constitutes the raison d'etre of the vast majority of local
"third world" struggles for legitimate governance. Yet, an ever-increasing
majority of the fundamental broad policy decisions that affect the lives of
"third world" peoples, i.e. framework governance decisions, are neither
made by their state, nor by any institution within it. Most of these frame-
work governance decisions are increasingly the province of supranational
bodies such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), the IMF, and the WB.
Some of these decisions are even made in the presidential palaces and par-
liaments of great power states such as the USA, France, and Britain. For
example, is there any serious scholar that believes that it is still really open
to any "third world" state, the recipient of an IMF or WB loan as most are,
to choose to practice socialist economics?
If true then that the major policy decisions that affect the lives of
"third world" peoples, (i.e. the framework governance policies), are often
pre-determined and pre-established by entities, and in places, external 16 to
15 As used in this chapter, "governance" refers to "decision-making" about the
issues and things that concern the lives of a given people. The Commission on
Global Governance chaired by Shridath Ramphal and Ingvar Carlson similarly de-
fine this concept thus:
"Governance is the sum of the of the many ways individuals and
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It
is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse in-
terests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be
taken."
OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD, id. at 2 (emphasis added).
16 It is sometimes contended that these framework governance policies and deci-
sions are really negotiated between the relevant "third world" state and the relevant
external force such as the IMF or the WB. In the context of the extraordinary im-
balance in negotiating power that characterises such "negotiations" and the fact that
they usually occur in the context of attempting to arrest the collapse of the econ-
omy of a given "third world" state, one must be dubious as to the egalitarian actual
character of such "negotiations". See Yusuf Bangura & Peter Gibbon, Adjustment,
Authoritarianism and Democracy: An Introduction to Some Conceptual and Empir-
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the third world: Thus, in connection with the centrality of the right of par-
ticipation in governance to most "third world" struggles for legitimate gov-
ernance, several questions arise. Participation in governance to what end?
Why should "third world" legitimate governance activists dissipate their
scarce resources waging struggles that aim to wrest from their own govern-
ments the right of the generality of their peoples to participate in their own
ical Issues, in AUTHoRrrARIANISM, DEMOCRACY AND ADJUSTMENT 7 (P. Gibbon et
al. eds., 1992). Indeed some have characterised such "negotiated" framework gov-
ernance policies as impositions on the part of the IMF and the WB. See for instance
0. Morrissey, "Conditionality and Compliance: The Sustainability of Adjustment
in Turkey" in 0. Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank
Cass, 1995) at 297. Indeed, Bungura and Gibbon have noted that "[t]he great ma-
jority of countries in ... [Africa] have adopted - more or less involuntarily -
programmes of economic reform designed by the international financial institu-
tions". See BUNGURA & GIBBON, supra. Credence is lent to this last view by the
striking similarity in the framework governance package that has emerged from
each of these negotiations. They each embody very similar sets of policy condition-
alities. If they were really negotiated, in the context of the great diversity in the
nature of the states to which such framework policies have been applied, one would
expect to see substantial differences in the broad policy prescriptions prescribed for
different "third world" states. Yet, not even one of them has been characterised by
socialist economics! For example, Turkey's World Bank-Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) imposed huge cuts in public spending. See 0. Morrissey, ibid at
295. So did Ghana's World Bank/IMF-SAP programme. See P. Mosley, J. Harigan
and J.Toye, "Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending V.2
(London: Routledge, 1991) at 170-183. So did Thailand's IMF SAP. See id. at 114-
135. So did the Philippines. See id. at 44-50. And so did Zimbabwe's so-called
home grown SAP referred to as ESAP. See S.J. MacLean, The Effects of Structural
Adjustment on Civil Society in Zimbabwe: Implications for Canadian Aid Policy 18
CAN. J. DEV. STUD. 463, 464 (1997). Even Nigeria's peculiar SAP programme was
based on essentially similar principles. See MUSTAPHA, supra note 16, at 188. The
close similarity, if not sameness, of these SAPs is based on the IMF's and the WB's
strong conviction that there is a broad consensus in the world about the rightness of
its policy prescriptions as elixirs for all the economic problems of "third world"
states, what Beckman has described as fictitious consensus. Yet as Beckman has
noted, "[f]ar from being insignificant, opposition to SAP is widespread and keeps
on causing obstruction". B. Beckman, Empowerment or Repression? The World
Bank and the Politics of African Development, see GIBBON, supra note 16, at 86-
87. Suffice it to note, as the UN Economic Commission has noted in its extensive
critique of IMF and SAP policies in Africa, that broad policy formulations such as
those contained in the SAP programs that assume Africa's oneness to mean Af-
rica's sameness are inherently defective. See B. Ikubolajeh Logan and K. Mengis-
teab, BEYOND ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN AFRICA 1 (1995).
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governance, when the very decisions they seek control over have been pre-
determined by entities that they neither elected nor sanctioned? Of what
eventual use are these struggles when such decision-making powers are al-
ready beyond the province of the very state from which they seek to wrest
that power? For instance, if the fundamental broad policy decisions, or
framework governance power, regarding the extent to which the govern-
ment of a particular "third world" state can allocate resources to its health
care system are substantially made in the boardrooms of the IMF and/or the
WB, 1 7 of what use is it for the relevant "third world" people to dissipate
most of their energies in seeking to win from their own governments the
right to participate in the governance of their healthcare system? In the
event of success, would not the prize for which they had fought so hard still
elude them, i.e. would they still not lack control over the framework gov-
ernance of their healthcare system? It can of course be argued in reply that
the relevant people would in that event still be able to govern many other
minor decisions regarding the actual day-to-day functioning of their health-
care system. That may be true but, the relevant people will not be able to
exercise ultimate democratic control, as they ought to in a democracy, over
the framework governance of their healthcare system, and that no amount of
control over the marginal decisions regarding that system can substitute for
this substantial erosion of framework governance power. Moreover, the
above-stated hypothetical objection grossly underestimates the extent to
which the control of the day-to day functioning of the system depends on
the nature of the framework governance decisions regarding the system in
question.
A critical assessment of the literature relating to the production and
dissemination of international legal/political/economic norms, regulations,
and practices, illustrates and reinforces the major points that are being
made. These are that the broad policy outlines that guide governance in
third world states are not constructed within those states either by a demo-
cratic participatory process or by a sectional dictatorial process (in both
cases, framework governance), and that consequently, such broad policy
decisions, such framework governance policies, are made in places external
to "third world" states. In both the norms of global governance and the
17 Indeed, in the case of most "third world" states, such decisions as to budgetary
allocations as between competing ends are usually the subject of framework gov-
ernance decisions made by the IMF and/or the WB and are embodied in Structural
Adjustment Programme Documents (ostensibly designed in consultation with the
relevant government but in reality the adopted in a context in which the govern-
ment has little choice in the matter). See BANGURA & GIBBON, supra note 16, at 7.
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practices of international institutions and great power states, can one source
graphic illustrations of the above points.
Indeed, it is no longer controversial to assert, as many other schol-
ars have, that the international legal and political system has been, and re-
mains, intensely involved in the production and dissemination of "normal"
ideas about what kinds of governance are legitimate and what sorts are
not.18 That there is, a discernible concept of legitimate governance in the
international legal/political system.' 9 Also, it is neither novel nor controver-
sial to demonstrate, as many other scholars have done, that this same inter-
national legal/political system is also intensely involved in the
dissemination and implementation of this specific concept of legitimate
governance. 20 For instance, Professor Antony Anghie has convincingly
shown that not only do these two patterns of international action have a
long pedigree, dating back at least to the 15th century European encounter
with the peoples of the so called "new world".21 Professor Makau wa Mutua
has demonstrated the specific rootedness of the main stock of this concept
in the Liberal philosophical tradition.22 Thus, the fact that international (and
thus substantially external) institutions and processes have, and continue to
18 See, e.g., O.C. Okafor, The Concept of Legitimate Governance in the Contem-
porary International Legal System XLIV NETHERLANDS INT'L REV. 33 (1997);
T.M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance 86 AJIL 46 (1992);
D.A. Rustow, Democracy: A Global Revolution? 69 FOREIGN AFF. 75 (1990); H.J.
Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 H~Av. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 77
(1988).
19 See, Okafor, supra note 18, at 33.
20 See for example A. Anghie, "Universality and the Evolution of the Concept of
Governance in International Law" in E.K. Quashigah and 0. C. Okafor, eds., Legit-
imate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 21; O.C. Okafor, "The Global Process
of Legitimation and the Legitimacy of Global Governance" (1997) 14 Arizona
Journal of International and Comparative Law 117; I. Claude, "Collective Legiti-
mation as a Political Function of the United Nations" (1966) 20 International Or-
ganisation 367; J. Frowein, "the European Community and the Requirement of a
Republican Form of Government" (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1311; and
D.D. Caron, "Governance and Collective Legitimation in the New World Order"
(1993) 6 Hague Yearbook of International Law 29.
21 See A. Anghie, "Franscisco de Vittoria and the Colonial Origins of Interna-
tional Law" (1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 321.
22 See Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights: Toward post-Liberal
Democracy?, in LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND Do-
MESTIC LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 109 (Edward K. Quashigah & Obiora C. Okafor eds.,
1999).
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have, a huge impact on the construction of the framework that guides the
determination of what kinds of "third world" governance are legitimate, and
what sorts are not, is now trite. Yet in an age of globalisation when these
international institutions and processes are fully expected to continue gain-
ing more and more influence over domestic decision-making processes,
there is little explicit recognition in the mainstream literature that, for the
relatively weaker "third world," increases in the international "share" of the
governance pie inexorably entails corresponding decreases in the real do-
mestic "share" of that pie. There is also little recognition that such loss of
real self-governance power occurs in ways that often render many "third
world" struggles for legitimate governance, based primarily on the assump-
tion of relative domestic control over the governance pie, substantively and
ultimately futile.
Again, it is now trite knowledge that, for good or for bad, a number
of international financial institutions hold an ever-increasing "share" of
third world framework governance. 23 That much is implied by the IMF's
and WB's self-admitted involvement in the design of the framework socio-
economic and even political agenda of "third world" states,24 as well as by
the descriptis of the nature of the IMF and/or WB programmes they adopt
that are offered by many "third world" states.25 Moreover, the literature is
23 The major instrument that facilitates this acquisition of "third world" frame-
work governance is the "conditionality". According to Polak:
"In the terminology of the International Monetary Fund, 'condi-
tionality' refers to the policies the fund expects a member to fol-
low in order to avail itself of credit from the Fund."
JACQUES J. POLAK, THE CHANGING NATURE OF IMF CONDmTONALITY 1 (1991).
Another way in which the IMF and WB exact the leverage that is necessary in
order to impose their will over "third world" states is via their liaison within inter-
national capital exporting states and other entities For example British Foreign
Minister, Robin Cook, recently declared while on a visit to Nigeria that "the inter-
national community" (meaning Britain, the USA and other capital-exporting states
of the North) are unlikely to consider granting some debt relief for Nigeria if it does
not adopt the prescriptions suggested by the IMF for the improvement of its econ-
omy. See NIGERIAN GUARDIAN, (March 19, 1999) <http://www.ngrguardiannews.
com/nn743201.htm>.
24 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Good Governance - The IMF's Role
(1997), <http://www.imf org/externalIpubs/ft/exrp/goverl govindex.html>.
25 For instance Nigerian Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar has de-
scribed the IMF Staff Monitored Programme that Nigeria has recently agreed to
implement if it is to have its debts rescheduled as "a compendium of policy pre-
scriptions which aims, over a three-year period, to attain sustainable growth and
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replete with suggestions in this direction. For instance, Louis Pauly has
shown that:
"The central mandates of both organisations [in this case
the IMF and the League of Nations] ...explicitly in the
case of the IMF, involved the oversight of national policies




Cheryl Payer has noted that "It]he World Bank is the foremost international
development agency. Some call it the best, some call it the worst; but no
one escapes it influence. '27 Again, Professor Manfred Bienefeld has re-
cently offered a rather compelling and quite convincing account of this
ever-strengthening capacity of the IMF and the WB (the Bretton Woods
institutions) to acquire control of economic decision-making within "third
world" states.28 While Payer has shown how the World Bank is able to
"force borrowing governments to abandon [their own] progressive policies
in favour of [the World Bank's preferred] harsh austerity programs. '29 For
his own part, Polak has noted that the changing and deepening nature of
IMF framework governance has involved a narrowing of its clientele to its
developing country members;30 a phenomenon which is of recent ancestry. 3'
Polak goes further to declare, as most other scholars of the IMF and WB
have, that:
"The Fund is an international organisation that wields con-
siderable influence, primarily vis-6-vis members seeking its
credit, but also through its surveillance of its membership
in general.
'32
development of the Nigerian economy." See NIGERIAN VANGUARD, (February 15,
1999) <http;//www.afbis.com/vanguard/f2150299.html>.
26 Louis W. PAULY, WHO ELECTED THE BANKERS? SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL
IN THE WORLD BANK 18 (1997) (emphasis added).
27 See C. Payer, The World Bank: A Critical Analysis (New York: Monthly Re-
view Press, 1982) at 15.
28 See M. Bienefeld, "Structural Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy in
Southern Africa" (unpublished paper on file with this writer) at 7; and M.
Bienefeld, "The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism" (1994) 15 Third
World Quarterly 31.
29 See C. Payer, supra note 27.
30 See POLAK, supra note 23, at 1.
31 See id. at 2.
32 See id. at 24.
14 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 6
The same scholar then goes further to clearly demonstrate, in a manner that
graphically illustrates the nature of the relationship between "third world"
states and the IMF, the way in which the IMF exercises control over the
framework governance agenda and practices of "third world" states. Ac-
cording to Polak, the approvals of IMF and WB loans to their clients
(mostly "third world" states) are preceded by submission of a Policy Frame-
work Paper by the relevant government (drafted by IMF, WB and that gov-
ernments staff) showing the broad outlines of the socio-economic policies
of the relevant country for the coming three years.
Indeed, some of the scholarly and popular discourse on the beha-
viour of the IMF and the World Bank, and the richer states of the world, do
not simply acknowledge the fundamentally external nature of the control of
framework "third world" decision-making, but more or less go further to
urge its consolidation. 33 Given the fact that both institutions are far from
infallible, 34 the extremely controversial record of their involvement in "third
world" states,35 and the fact that economists are hardly agreed as to whether
33 Now, even though these calls for the consolidation of the power of the IMF and
the WB are usually couched in universal terms, in terms that suggest a correspond-
ing level of control over the policies of both the powerful states of the north and the
weaker states of the south, it seems clear enough that the ability of such interna-
tional economic institutions to control the fundamental economic decision-making
processes of the much more powerful states is at best minimal. Their capacity to
exert pressure and influence the governance of states decreases quite sharply as the
relevant state becomes more powerful. Their share of the economic governance pie
decreases on a sliding scale of state power; as the state gets stronger, so does the
power of these international bodies. Thus, in reality, these institutions can only
control the framework governance of the weaker and less powerful states of the
"third world". For examples of more or less favourable views of global governance
by the IMF and WB, see the accounts in B. Plewes et al, "Sustainable Human
Development as a Global Framework" (1996) LI International Journal 211.
34 Indeed, Polak has described the IMF's recent history as one characterised by
"[t]he frequent failures of Fund arrangements in the 1980s" which "appear to have
had a sobering influence" on the IMF. See POLAK, supra note 23, at 64. Again,
Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello and Kamal Mallhotra have, in the context of their
analysis of the role played by international financial institutions in the recent Asian
economic crisis, convincingly demonstrated that neither the IMF nor the WB has
what they refer to as "a monopoly of social and economic wisdom (far from it)".
See N. Bullard et al., Taming the Tigers: The IMF and the Asian Crisis 19 THMRD
WORLD Q. 505 (1998).
35 Some have described their policies as outright failures, while some have noted
the many defects that characterise these policies. For examples of those who out-
rightly dismiss past IMF and WB policies in the "third world" as failures (a stance
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these institutions are a part of the solution to the economic problems of
""third world" states, or a part of the problem, 36 one cannot but flinch at the
seemingly inevitable prospect of the greater intrusion of the largely unac-
countable IMF and the WB into the socio-economic lives of "third world"
which these institutions have not quite embraced but which they themselves now
come quite close to adopting in their more recent performance reports), see Payer,
supra note 27, at 21; S.P. Schatz, The World Bank's Fundamental Misconception in
Africa, 34 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 239 (1996); and S.P. Schatz, Structural Adjustment
in Africa: A Failing Grade So Far, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 679 (1994). For the
more generous critiques, see T.M. Shaw, Prospects for a New Political Economy of
Development in the Twenty-First Century, 18 CAN. J. DEV. STUD. 375, 378; J.Y.
Auvinen, IMF Intervention and Political Protest in the Third World: A Conven-
tional Wisdom Refined, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 377; and J. Adams, Review Article:
Structural Adjustment, Safety Nets and Destitution, 46 EcON. DEV. & Soc. CHANGE
403 (1998). Moderate as he is in his critique of the SAP policies of the IMF and the
WB, John Adams could not help but observe that:
International Policy makers cannot allege that they have solved
the mysteries of fomenting universal growth while there are two
or more billion people living miserably on the planet, with more
people of the way. Intoning ritual chants in collective cadence at
the annual gathering of the international agency clans in Wash-
ington is no doubt an uplifting experience for a minuscule portion
of the global elite but is as likely to bring rain on the nearby
White House lawn as it is to make a quality-of-life difference in
Somalia, Nepal, or Haiti.
Id. at 404.
36 For instance, Ikubojajeh Logan and Mengisteab have while showing that IMF
and WB policies have been part of the problem in "third world" states, noted that:
"Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have now been in op-
eration for over a decade in many sub-Saharan countries. Yet
their appropriateness for overcoming Africa's economic crisis re-
mains as controversial as when they were first introduced."
See B. Ikubojajeh Logan and K. Mengisteab, "Introduction" in K. Mengisteab and
B. Ikubojajeh Logan, Beyond Economic Liberalisation in Africa (London: Zed
Books, 1995) at 1.
The most vocal challenge to IMF and WB claims as to the appropriateness
of SAPs as elixirs for Africa's economic problems have been voiced by the UN
Economic Commission for Africa, a sister UN agency! See ibid at 1. This is a
stance that is quite popular on the African continent. See J.E. Nyang'oro, "The
Evolving Role of the African State Under Structural Adjustment" in J.E. Nyang'oro
and T.M. Shaw, eds., Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa (New York: Praeger,
1992) at 15.
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peoples in this new millennium.37 This is not evidence of some inherent
anti-IMF/WB bias, but evidence of discomfort at the ever-consolidating
tendency of these external entities to pre-empt the possibility of real local
democratic decision-making.
Again, some of the literature even highlights the extent to which
these external forces such as the IMF and the World Bank acquire effective
control over the socio-economic governance of "third world" states with the
active acquiescence of "third world" governments. All-too-often, however,
very little is said by these same writers about the real nature of such so-
called acquiescence. Very little, if anything at all, is said about the extent to
which such acquiescence is likely obtained through the use of intense eco-
nomic coercion, as for instance, when such control over the governance of a
"third world" state is obtained after an external force (such as the IMF) has
threatened the relevant state with loss of its international credit rating and
credit line;38 a threat that if actualised could lead to the immediate or even-
tual economic paralysis of that state.
39
Just as the IMF and the WB (and a number of other powerful exter-
nal forces) have substantially appropriated third world framework govern-
ance in our time, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has, for
good or for bad, also partaken of this acquisitive feast. The UNSC and other
UN organs are so imbricated in the lives of both "third world" and non-third
world states that the United Nations (UN) recently declared in one of its
many information booklets that:
"The United Nations deals with the world's major
problems. That much is common knowledge. Perhaps less
well known is the fact that this organization is also a part of
your daily life. In fact, you probably wouldn't want to live
without it."4
Yet over and beyond this self-confessed intrusiveness of the UN in the daily
lives of all of us, and of the peoples of "third world" states in particular, the
37 At the moment more and more third world states including those that were
thought to have "passed" into the developed world are coming under IMF frame-
work governance and supervisory control. South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia
certainly have. See N. Bullard et al, supra note 34 at 510-528.
38 This sort of threat has been prevalent since the 1980s economic downturn in
many "third world" states. Seee.g., M. Bienefeld, Structural Adjustment and the
Prospects for Democracy in Southern Africa (1998) (on file with author). See also
N. Bullard et al, supra ntoe 37, at 510, 516.
39 An international credit line is the basic requirement for international trade.
40 See THE UNIrED NATIONS IN OuR DAIY LivEs iii (United Nations 1998).
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most powerful organ of the UN, the UNSC, has enlarged its capacity to
shape the framework governance of "third world" states. The extreme mani-
festations of this capacity of the UNSC and its most powerful member-
states to acquire "third world" framework governance include its direct ad-
ministration of Cambodia for a number of months41, and its post-gulf war
activities in Iraq.42 Additionally, the UNSC and its sister UN organs are also
involved in the shaping of the norms and rules that are supposed to guide
governance in "third world" states, as well as in the attempts to discipline
those states that deviate from the established norms or rules. Good exam-
ples include norms outlawing genocide, apartheid, military coups d'etat
against elected regimes. Regimes of discipline imposed against deviant
states, such as the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals
for Bosnia and Rwanda; the ousting of General Cedras-led and Major
Koroma-led juntas in Haiti and Sierra Leone, respectively; when the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) regulating the Iraqi the defence
agenda.
43
A few of the Great Powers have also partaken of this "third world"
framework governance feast, and established regulatory arrangements de-
signed to guide, or even dictate, the governance of "third world" states.
Whether via the establishment of so-called "no-fly zones" over northern
and southern Iraq,44 the political conditionalities attached to development
assistance rendered to "third world" states, 45 or their virtual imposition of
treaty frameworks designed to bring peace to troubled areas of the world
such as the Dayton Peace Accord, 46 these Great Powers have increasingly
attempted to frame governance in most "third world" states within parame-
41 See M. Berdal and M. Leifer, "Cambodia" in J. Mayall, ed., The New Interven-
tionism 1991-1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 25-35; IMF,
"Cambodia" (1994) IMF Economic Reviews at 1-7; and United Nations, The
United Nations and Cambodia 1991-1995 (New york: United Nations, 1995) at 9-
24.
42 See United Nations, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict (New
York: United Nations, 1996) at 74-110.
43 Id.
44 See "'No-Fly' Zones: Success or failure?" http://www.msnbc.com/news/
227676.asp#BODY.
45 See 0. Stokke, ed., supra note 1 at 1.
46 The ways in which these Great powers assume the framework or direct govern-
ance of parts of the developing world under such treaty arrangements is illustrated
by the recent sack order issued in march 1999 under the Dayton Peace accords to
the elected President of the Bosnian Serbs, Nikola Poplasen, by the top interna-
tional mediator in Bosnia who also acts as the overseer of the implementation of
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ters established by, and acceptable to, themselves (even if not necessarily
acceptable to the leadership and/or population of the relevant state).
Hence "third world" states have lost a measure of control over
some portions of their governance agenda and decision-making processes.
Nevertheless, before our very eyes, many of the important political and eco-
nomic decisions that affect the lives of their peoples are, for good or for
bad, still made by "third world" governments. Inter alia, important deci-
sions about the detailed nature of electoral rules, rules that guiding imports
and exports, women's rights, the allocation of resources, are still made by
"third world" governments. However, while these "third world" govern-
ments still make most of the day-to-day (micro) decisions that affect the
lives of their peoples, the framework (macro) decisions as well as the most
crucial decisions are increasingly being made and outlined by forces exter-
nal and much more powerful than these "third world" states. The implica-
tion being that as the globalisation of the world's economy and the politics
creates the conditions under which entities and institutions that are external
to the "third world" enlarge their power over the framework governance of
"third world" states, the scope of the governance agenda and decision-mak-
ing that remains within "third world" states significantly diminishes, and
becomes more and more insignificant.
Consequently, as the local share of the governance agenda and de-
cision-making shrinks, the quantity and quality of actual and potential sub-
stantive democratic participation correspondingly shrinks; thus "third
world" struggles for local participation in governance focused on the popu-
lar assumption within the state's borders of a governance capacity that al-
ready lies without the borders of that state, are ultimately rendered futile.47
the accords. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_291000/
291135.stm.
47 This raises an important question whether in this way both the formal and sub-
stantive democratic participation of the peoples of "third world" states in their own
governance is not pre-empted by international technocratic decision-making
power? As Thomas Franck has warned:
"Even those who accept that trade, environment and chemical
weapons need to be regulated globally, if they are to be regulated
at all, will sooner or later manifest unease at the new international
regimes' lack of political accountability."
See T.M. Franck, "Notes from the President" ASIL Newsletter Jan-Feb 1999 at 4.
Manfred Bienefeld, has himself declared that:
"Government and political processes have thus been emptied of
political content. Governments have become executive agencies
that implement pre-determined, sound policies devised by techni-
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While such struggles are of course very important, they are no longer, cen-
tral to the success of the movement for legitimate governance in "third
world" states as they once were. For after external entities such as the IMF
and the WB have partaken of the governance agenda and decision-making
with respect to a particular "third world" state, there is little left of the
framework governance power of that state for its people to shape. From
healthcare to housing, food subsidies to fertilisers, educational spending to
the privatisation of economic activities, the powerful imprimatur and fin-
gerprint.of the IMF and the WB is clearly visible and dominant.
Given the increasingly external sources of framework governance
in "third world" states, and corresponding decrease of internal decision-
making, conceptual frameworks and methodologies for "third world" legiti-
mate governance struggles must now be much more mindful of the location
of governance away from "third world" states. And as we shall see, the first
step toward this more viable attitude must involve three movements,
namely: a re-conception of the relative location of "third world" govern-
ance; a relative re-location of the site(s) of resistance, and a conceptualiza-
tion and re-formulation of the strategies of those minded to participate in
the struggle for legitimate-governance in the "third world."
HI. RE-CONCEIVING THE LOCATION(S) OF GOVERNANCE AND RESISTANCE
IN CONTEMPORARY "THIRD WORLD" STATES
Flowing from a recognition of the relative control exercised by ex-
ternal entities over the framework governance agenda and governance prac-
tices of "third world" states, is the very consequential question of whether
and to what extent the identity of the repositories of "third world" frame-
work governance has affected the relative location of "third world" govern-
ance. A correlate question is whether the relative re-location of governance
that has stemmed from such a shift in the identity of the repositories of
"third world" framework governance has correspondingly dictated the iden-
tity and nature of the sites where resistance to such specific forms of gov-
ernance would be most effective? These are the primary questions that I
will address in this section of the paper. Following that discussion, I will
move on to section IV where I will deal with the question of the implica-
tions of the relative re-location of "third world" framework governance for
the strategies adopted by legitimate governance movements that operate in
those areas of the globe.
cal experts... That is why both the struggle and debate.., must
focus on the substance, not the appearance of, democracy."
See M. Bienefeld, supra note 38, at 15.
20 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 6
It seems clear enough-from the analysis in section II that the rela-
tive location of governance in most "third world" states has shifted consid-
erably in the direction of entities external to these states (be they the IMF,
the WB, or the UNSC). 48 At the very least, the framework governance of
the fundamental issues that affect the daily lives of the peoples of "third
world" states, such as healthcare, housing, job security, food security, de-
fence, political participation, childhood, womanhood, and education, is in-
creasingly the province of entities external to these states.
49
Despite the relative externalisation of "third world" framework
governance, the relevant literature has not been sufficiently cognisant of the
necessity for a corresponding externalisation of resistance to "third world"
governance. It has failed to clearly recognise the imperative for a relative
but substantial shift in the nature of the sites at which resistance to the
repositories of such framework governance would be most effective. A shift
that is clearly suggested by this fact of the relative re-location of "third
world" governance (in the form of the ever-increasing externalisation of
"third world" framework governance) in our time.
Yet, ultimately, a cognitive lapse as serious as a lack of awareness
of the actual location(s) of "third world" framework governance could be
paralysing for most "third world" legitimate governance movements. This
potential for paralysis is easily illustrated. For instance, a campaign of civil
disobedience directed at the Health Ministry and/or Presidency of "X" (a
48 This is of course not the first time that the governance of the areas of the world
that are referred to as the "third world" has re-located in favour of forces external to
those areas. This has happened in earlier phases of human history such as during
the European colonisation of the Americas from the 15th century on, and during the
European colonisation of Afro-Asia between the middle of the 19th century and the
middle of the 20th century. See for instance, A. Anghie, "Franscico de Vittoria"
supra note 21. It has also been contended by many scholars that the formal end of
colonialism in most parts of the "third world" in the 1960s and 1970s did not infact
put an end to the retention by European states of framework governance over most
of the emergent "third world" states. This phenomenon is candidly referred to in
the literature as "neo-colonialism" or less candidly subsumed under the rubric of
"globalisation" or "global governance". See for instance, B. Beckman, supra note
16, at 88 ( who declares that: "[t]he 'conditionalities' linked to the foreign finance
that goes with SAP are the hallmark of rising neo-colonial domination"); and K.
Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Nelson,
1965). See also M. Doornbos, "State Formation Processes Under External Supervi-
sion: Reflections on 'Good Governance"' in 0. Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Con-
ditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1995) at 377.
49 See P. Mosley, et al, supra note 16; and K. Mengisteab and B. Ikubolajeh Lo-
gan, eds., supra note 16.
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"third world" state) in order to force it to fund more hospitals for the benefit
of the population of "X" state would be virtually pointless if in fact, as is
increasingly the case, the framework governance issue of the devotion of a
certain amount of funding to hospitals in "X" state has been decided by and
at the WB and/or the IMF as a policy conditionality for approving a credit
lifeline for that state. In this allegorical case, all that is left for local institu-
tions and local democratic processes to decide is simply the secondary and
relatively marginal question of how to allocate a paltry health budget
among several competing hospitals. The fundamental framework decision
as to whether or not these hospitals deserve more or less funding in that
context would be passe, having already been made by entities external to
that state, who, as must be pointed out, can hardly be described as the re-
positories of the governance mandate of the people of the relevant state!50
Clearly, in such a case, framework health-care governance would have re-
located and externalised from the relevant "third world" state.
Given this evidence of the relative re-location of their own frame-
work governance away from "third world" states, this increasingly potent
movement toward the externalisation of "third world" governance, to what
extent is the domestic polity and its institutions an appropriate site of legiti-
mate governance struggles as regards "third world" states? To what extent
is the domestic polity and its institutions an appropriate site of resistance to
the modes of governance experienced by "third world" peoples? As I have
50 The argument can of course be made that these framework govemance arrange-
ments are never designed or implemented without the approval of the presumed
representatives of the people of the relevant state who after all can be said to have a
choice whether or not to agree to the terms of the IMF and/or WB policy condition-
ality. Proponents of this view may even point out the case of Nigeria's rejection of
an IMF conditional loan facility in the mid-1980s after a vigorous public debate.
The appropriate response to such an argument is as follows. Firstly, IMF and/or
WB loan conditionalities are designed well before they are presented to the relevant
state for "negotiation". They are based on a particular view of economics (see M.
Bienefeld, supra note 28). That is why the conditionalities imposed on most "third
world" states are most similar. These are pre-packaged "elixirs". Secondly, to argue
that these states have a real choice whether or not to accept the conditionalities is to
ignore the fact that at the point at which these states begin negotiations for an IMF
or WB loan, they are not in a position to challenge the IMF at all or to really reject
the loan. They do so at the peril of being severely punished by international mar-
kets, banks, financiers and the Industrial powers. In the case of Nigeria's so-called
rejection of the IMF loan in the 1980s, what actually occurred was that Nigeria
ostensibly rejected the IMF loan but actually began to implement all of the IMF's
demands, a manoeuvred that allowed it to obtain a similar WB loan! See B. Beck-
man, supra note 16 at 93.
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already asked, must not the location of governance dictate the sites and
locations where resistance to that specific form of governance would be
most effective? If the logic implied in this question is correct, the more
appropriate sites of resistance to the modes of governance experienced by
"third world" peoples would be tied to the identity and the location of those
forces that have acquired the relative power to make framework governance
decisions regarding the things that affect the lives of those peoples the most.
Consequently, while not abandoning the equally important domestic arena,
the sites of resistance to illegitimate governance (as well as the sites of
struggle for legitimate governance) in the "third world" ought to be re-lo-
cated to the external sites from where unaccountable power is exercised
over most of the "third world," to these engine-houses of "third world"
framework governance. This re-locative praxis is important if such strug-
gles are to reflect the reality of the location of "third world" framework
governance and maximise the potential of such struggles to be effective in
the coming millennium. For, in the end, of what use will a resistance cam-
paign aimed at influencing the course of the governance of a "third world"
state be if it is misdirected to a site void of framework governance power?
Of what use is it to continue to wage most "third world" campaigns of
resistance to perceived bad governance in the surburbs, rather than at the
centres, of framework governance power?
This is not to say that the domestic polity in third world states
should henceforth be abandoned as a site of resistance; far be it. No serious
minded scholar/activist would favour such a course of action. And as Jack
Donnelly has recently observed, the struggle for human rights (including
legitimate governance rights) will in the end be won or lost by domestic
activists and activism. 5' Rather, while the domestic polity and domestic in-
stitutions must remain the primary sites of resistance to the forms of gov-
ernance that are still actually exercised by "third world" states (such as
secondary decision-making that gives effect to the framework decisions),
such domestic polities ought no longer be the primary sites of resistance to
the specific forms of governance that have migrated well beyond the reach
of most "third world" states of our time, namely their own framework
governance.
The foregoing discussion begs the question of strategy: in the face
of the relative re-location of "third world" framework governance and the
corresponding imperative that resistance to such framework governance be
re-located, what are the appropriate ways in which the strategies of resis-
tance to such governance can be re-conceived in order to make more effec-
tive the struggles for legitimate governance in the "third world" states of the
51 See J. Donnelly, supra note 9.
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new millennium. This is an issue that I will deal with squarely in the fol-
lowing section of this chapter.
IV. RE-CONCEIVING THE STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE IN THE WAKE OF
THE FRAMEWORK GOVERNANCE SHIFIr
Quite apart from the meta-strategic questions regarding the relative
location of "third world" framework governance, and the relative appropri-
ateness of a given site as a location of "third world" resistance to illegiti-
mate governance, there are other very important micro-strategic questions
that deserve attention in the context of the re-conception of "third world"
struggles for legitimate governance in the new millennium. Such micro-
strategic questions flow logically from the arguments put forward in sec-
tions II and III of this chapter, namely: that the share of their own frame-
work governance effectively controlled by "third world" states is relatively
small, and continues to diminish in the wake of the continual consolidation
of regimes of international governance and discipline; that the relative loca-
tion of framework governance in "third world" states is increasingly exter-
nal; and that for "third world" peoples the choice of the sites for more
effective legitimate governance struggles and resistance campaigns must re-
flect this continual consolidation of external entities as the repositories of
"third world" framework governance.
I shall examine these crucial micro-strategic questions under three
heads: cautious participation, mass-based politics, and alternative forms of
networking. I will suggest that unless the activist theoreticians and protago-
nists of "third world" resistance campaigns and "third world" struggles for
legitimate governance achieve a greater amount of real participation within
the processes of the external entities and institutions that are indeed the
major repositories of the framework governance of "third world" states, be-
gin to pay even greater attention to the need for their governance praxis to
be guided by and referenced through a politics that is mass-based, and real-
ise the imperative need to weave effective but more equal networks with
relatively empathetic minds outside the "third world," they will be less
likely to appreciably advance their agenda in the coming millennium. The
point is not of course that "third world" activists have not tried to combine
micro-strategies in the past.
All too often attempts by "third world" states to participate on a
more equal basis in global politics, economics, and norm-creation or imple-
mentation have been frustrated and ridiculed. 52 Many of the past attempts of
52 See for instance the ridicule that first greeted assertions made by "third world"
states of their right to development. For account of this, see O.C. Okafor, "The
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made "third world" scholars and activist to reflect and voice the deepest
yearnings of their peoples have been dismissed and pilloried.53 Far too
many attempts by "third world" activists to forge more equal networks with
like-minds outside the "third world" have resulted in very disappointing and
de-mobilising rehashes of all-too-subtle, but nevertheless recognisable and
familiar, indications as to the "place" that "third world" activists ought to
occupy in the international division of intellectual and activist labour.54 The
point is that given the global nature of the emerging political economy of
governance and resistance, there is an even greater need for these "third
world" activists to re-conceive their strategies and orient them once again in
the suggested directions, so as to have the chance of being more effective
within the emergent international context. For, as this millennium begins
and another ends, there is little room to be sanguine as to the potential for
success of those struggles for legitimate governance in "third world" states
that remain oblivious of the substantial migration of real power away from
nation-states in general, and "third world" states in particular.
A. Cautious Participation as an Imperative
Given the fact that, historically, the international system has com-
monly been wrought and constructed without the full and equal participa-
tion of "third world" states,55 and that there is increasing evidence for the
view that the contemporary international order continues to reflect this his-
toric disposition to exclude the "third world" from equal participation in
global governance, 56 the imperative for the real participation of "third
Status and Effect of the Right to Development in Contemporary International Law:
towards a South-North 'Entente' (1995) 7 African Journal of International and
Comparative Law 865.
53 For instance, Professor Makau wa Mutua has offered an account of the ridicule
that greeted many of the innovative features of the African Charter of Human and
Peoples' Rights right from the moment of its adoption. See M. wa Mutua, "The
Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Analysis of the Language
of Duties" 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339-380. It is noteworthy that
today many of these same features that were ridiculed in the literature have now
been embraced by the mainstream human rights literature!
54 See for instance J. Oloka-Onyango and S. Tamale, "'The Personal is Political'
or Why Women's Rights are Human Rights: An African Perspective on Interna-
tional Feminism" (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 691 at 698.
55 See R. Falk, "Historical Tendencies, Modernising and Revolutionary Nations
and the International Legal Order" (1962) 8 Howard Law Journal 128 at 133-135.
56 See R. Falk, id; Anghie, supra note 21; and Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, supra
note 54, at 698-700.
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world" activists in the international arena becomes clear. After all, it is at
this level that the external entities that presently dominate framework gov-
ernance in the "third world" operate.57 For good or for bad, with or without
the participation of the "third world," the policies and programs of these
external institutions that ultimately control framework governance in the
"third world" will be constructed and re-constructed in the coming millen-
nium. Such governance policies and programs have in the past been au-
thored and re-authored without the equal participation of the "third world",
and unless the "third world" obtains access to more equal participation in
these institutions, it will continue to bear the brunt of framework govern-
ance policies designed without their input.58 As Joe Oloka-Onyango and
Sylvia Tamale have put it in the context of African women's' (non)role in
the international women's movement:
"The point to remember is that the process of defining, ar-
ticulating, and executing the agenda.., at the international
level will take place with or without the involvement of
[the] third world ... This is largely due to the differential
access to the international institutions of decision-making
at which such agendas are ramified, in addition to the 'mis-
57 In this connection it is crucial to remember that the governance experience of
the peoples of "third world" states are not, and have not in recent history been, a
sole function of their own domestic choices. See T.M. Shaw and C. Adibe, "Africa
and Global Developments in the Twenty-First Century" (1995) LI International
Journal 1. B.S. Chimni, "The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the
South" (1998) 11 Journal of Refugee Studies 350; and J.E. Nyang'oro and T.M.
Shaw, "Introduction: African Development in the New Division of Labour" in J.E.
Nyang'oro and T.M. Shaw, Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa (New York:
Praeger, 1992) at 3.
58 Given the increasing recognition (even by the IMF and the WB) that the people
in whose country they work must participate fully in the implementation of IMF
and WB projects, and the recognition in the theoretical literature that policies and
projects designed in a "top-down" way are less likely to succeed than policies and
projects designed with the active participation of the people for whom the policies
and project affect the most, this tendency for international or external institutions to
design and implement policies and projects in the "third world" without the domi-
nant participation of the relevant peoples is startling. For the WB's adoption of the
discourse of "ownership", see, for example, THE WORLD BANK, STRENGTHENING
THE EFFECTrVENESS OF AiD: LESSONS FOR DONORS, ix (Washington, DC: The
World Bank ed,, 1995).
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sionary zeal' and jingoism by which such activities are fre-
quently dven.
59
What, however, does cautious participation in these international
institutions and processes mean to contemporary "third world" rights and
governance activists as they struggle to resist forms of illegitimate govern-
ance and enthrone or consolidate regimes of legitimate governance in their
target societies? Viewed from the more holistic optic of the contemporary
global political economy, it would seem that this implies a concerted effort
to foster effective participation in the decision-making processes of interna-
tional institutions such as the IMF, the WB, and the United Nations Secur-
ity Council, in the processes of transnational corporations, as well as a
number of the most powerful domestic centres of power (such as 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue and 10 Downing Street). Now, as used here, "partici-
pation" does not necessarily imply or involve membership or formal inclu-
sion. Participation can occur if indeed the relevant activists are able to exert
significant influence on the character of the decisions that are made by
these external entities. For example, in general, Non-Governmental Or-
ganisations (NGOs) sometimes affect the play of international politics with-
out formal inclusion or membership of the institutions or processes in which
such politics occurs.6°
What then would cautious participation in the IMF, the WB, and
the UNSC mean for "third world" legitimate governance activists? What
would such participation mean for these activists in the context of their
obvious lack of membership in, access to, and influence in, such interna-
tional institutions? While it is true that NGOs sometimes exert a modicum
of influence on these institutions, it is also true that such NGOs as are able
to do so are almost exclusively of northern pedigree. Nevertheless, as
programmatically oriented as they are, the ideals aspired to by "third world"
activists must exceed their present reach. The ideal of radically transform-
ing the heartland of the international framework governance process in or-
der to contribute more effectively to the shaping of the policies that
constitute the framework governance of "third world" states is on its own
unimpeachable. What is more doubtful is the extent to which this ideal can
be actualised.
59 See J. Oloka Onyango and S. Tamale, supra note 54 at 698.
60 See L. Gordenker and T.G. Weiss, "NGO Participation in the International Pol-
icy Process" (1995) 16 Third World Quarterly 543; P. Uvin, "Scaling Up the Grass-
roots and Scaling Down the Summit: The Relations Between Third World Non-
Governmental Organisations and the United Nations" (1995) 16 Third World Quar-
terly 495.
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The IMF and WB are themselves aware that they can no longer
ignore the movement for legitimate governance in these states. These insti-
tutions are increasingly becoming aware that the days of their behind the
scenes, non-accountable, framework governance of the "third world," when
they could without qualms turn a deaf ear to NGOs and "third world" activ-
iStS,6 ' are numbered. This is partly because of the just emerging recognition
on the part of domestic-based "third world" activists of the imperative need
to begin re-locating the struggle for legitimate governance in "third world"
states to the boardrooms, bureaus and bistros where relevant IMF, WB and
UNSC operatives may be found, whole maintaining internal efforts. barrios,
and bingos of "third world". 62 The IMF and the WB are beginning to insti-
tute processes through which they can interact with NGOs and civil society
groups.63 In Paul Nelson's words, "[t]he World Bank has climbed onto the
NGO bandwagon in a big way." 64 The same applies to the IMF, so much so
that Jan Aart Scholte has recently declared that, "interchanges between the
IMF and Civil Society have grown considerably in the 1990s. This budding
dialogue has much potential.
'65
The methodology for such dialogues between either the IMF or the
WB and civil society groups consists mostly in informal processes such as
The NGO-World Bank Committee established in 1984 (bringing 26 or so
NGOs together with several WB staff for semi-annual discussions), the
North American NGO Forum (initiated by the WB), and the NGO Parallel
Conferences coinciding with the Annual Meetings of the WB (for example
such conferences have taken place in Berlin in 1988, Bangkok, 1991, and
Washington 1989-90).66 This is because the formal organs of these institu-
61 See PAUL J. NELSON, THE WORLD BANK AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISA-
TIONS: THE LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (Houndmills: Macmillan
1995); Mark Robinson, Political Conditionality: Strategic Implications for NGOs,
in AID AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY, supra note 1, at 360, 360-376.
62 For example the leaders of the Nigerian Labour Conference have recently held
a series of meetings with the IMF staff, including its Managing Director, at which
they insisted that the IMF respect the rights of workers in Nigeria. See supra note
62.
63 See J.A. Scholte, "The IMF Meets Civil Society" (1998) Finance and Develop-
ment 1; L. Gordenker and T.G. Weiss, "NGO Participation in the International
Policy Process" (1995) 16 Third World Quarterly 543; B. Beckman, supra note 16.
64 Supra note 61.
65 Supra note 63 at 1.
66 See P.J. Nelson, supra note 61 at 56-59. See also J.A. Scholte, supra note
...... at 7 (regretting that IMF-civil society dialogue has on the whole been
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tions are far less open to civil society than other sister UN agencies. 6
7
There exists, however, a more or less semi-formal process via which civil
society groups can request a WB Independent Inspection Panel to investi-
gate a complaint regarding a particular project's capacity to harm any indi-
vidual's or group's rights and interests, because the bank has not followed
its own policies and procedures.68 The Panel reports to the Executive Direc-
tors of the Bank. This process does not, however, affect WB broad policies
and is not binding on the bank.
Though there are a number of important reasons for the "endorse-
ment" of such a dialogue by the IMF and the WB, 69 it must not be forgotten
that these processes and interactions were predominantly for the most part
instituted as a way of "managing" criticisms of their policies. For example,
it is the WB's practice to advertise its rather ad hoc, pragmatic, and infor-
mal engagement with NGOs and civil society, 70 while at the same time
seeking to minimise the damage it could sustain from criticisms levelled at
it by these segments of society.71 Thus, while the quantity of civil society
interactions with the WB and the IMF are on the rise, troubling questions
remain as to the quality of such interactions and collaboration. 72
The difficulties in the way of such civil society-WB and civil soci-
ety-IMF interactive and collaborative projects are many, and quite intense.
For one, the language that is spoken by the decision-makers at the IMF, the
WB and the UNSC is, all-too-often, not the language of global-level
democratisation or re-distribution. 73 Rather, it is a language that is steeped
in hierarchies, specialisation, technical expertise, paternalism, and firm con-
trol over the operations that they carry out.7
4
Again, tutored by their recent history, one cannot be sanguine as to
the possibility of the reform of these bodies in a way that allows the voices
of "third world" states let alone "third world" activists to be heard and re-
ally respected within the formal decision-making organs of these interna-
weakly institutionalised and haphazardly sustained); and P. Uvin, supra note 60 at
500-508.
67 Id at 2.
68 On this process, see <http://www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel>. The Bank has
to date received a over a dozen requests for inspection panels. See id.
69 These include the need for the exchange of information, policy debates, a chan-
nel from which the IMF and the WB can gauge public opinion. See id. at 2-3.
70 See P.J. Nelson, supra note 61 at 2.
71 Id. at 3.
72 Id. at 67.
73 See P.J. Nelson, supra note 61 at 9.
74 Id.
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tional institutions. 75 There is little evidence that the IMF or the WB have on
a sustained basis entered discussions with "third world" activists willing to
listen, learn from, or accommodate the activists. 76 As it stands, activist civil
society groups act mostly as implementers of some aspects of the projects
of these institutions, not as a part of the broad policy decision-making pro-
cess.77 Even in the 25% or so of cases where they are allowed to participate
in the design process, such participation has been limited to the design of
specific micro-projects, not in the design of governance policy.
78
Moreover, if it were possible that for civil society groups (whether
or not of "third world" pedigree) to significantly affect the processes and
outcomes of policy design by these institutions (a prospect that seems rather
dim at the moment 79), location and resources would still pose huge obsta-
cles in the way of "third world" activism.8 0 It is not difficult to imagine the
difficulty of arranging for a "bus-load" of "third world" activists to fly to
Washington DC from Indonesia in order to picket the promises of the IMF.
Even if they could raise the hundreds of thousands of dollars needed to run
such a campaign in an effective way, one cannot be very optimistic about
their ability to secure entry visas into the countries where the relevant insti-
tutions are located.8' Nor can one be easily convinced of the reasonableness
of spending a fortune on one very short campaign of resistance.
75 In the first place these institutions are not run democratically and operate deci-
sion-making processes that are based on weighted voting, a fact that skews their
policy orientation in the favour of the foreign policy objectives of a handful of
powerful states. See id. at 30-31 and 35.
76 See Scholte, supra note 63, at 7.
77 Id. at 67-68.
78 Id.
79 For one the WB and the IMF are usually wedded to a particular fundamental
ideology or point of view which they want to entrench by selecting information and
processes in ways that maintain a consistent view of the world, and of its role in
that world. See P.J. Nelson, supra note 61 at 9. For another, implementation rather
than policy design is the dominant role that these institutions assign to NGOs
within the framework of collaborating with them. See id. at 8.
80 Paul Nelson has shown how the location of these institutions in Washington Dc,
the capital of the USA, is a considerable obstacle to their collaboration with civil
society. See id. at 4.
81 This question about access to visa is not trivial in the least given the prevailing
anti-"third world" im migrant mood in most states of the hemispheric north. See
B.S. Chimni, supra note 81.
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Again, in the context of the inability of a numerical majority of
"third world" states to make the WB or the IMF accountable to them8 2,
optimism also falters regarding the capacity of civil society-WB and civil
society-IMF collaborations to, for any duration, fundamentally alter either
the guiding ideologies of these institutions or the framework policies and
practices with which they deal with the "third world. '83 These institutions
are far too rooted in a particular view of what international society ought to
"look like" to be that malleable or responsive. And this scepticism would be
enhanced especially if these civil society groups originate in the "third
world." This point is maintained even in the face of my measured optimism
as to the possibility of long term gains. I believe, though, that Jan Scholte
may have been a little too optimistic in his assessment of the present status
of NGOs within the IMF system when he declared, inter alia, that:
"The IMF has also enlarged its agenda and reshaped sev-
eral broad policy lines - in part, at the urging of certain civil
society groups - and is now devoting more attention to such
issues as poverty, environmental degradation, social spend-
ing, military expenditures, corruption and capital
markets." 84
The important point, however, is that there is some room for "third world"
activism within these institutions; room that ought to effectively utilised.
Moreover as Scholte has also noted, "[t]he IMF's policy changes may often
have fallen short of what civic groups had hoped for, but changes there have
been." 8
5
It must be noted though that despite their historic inability and pre-
sent incapacity to fundamentally alter the ideologies that guide the work of
the IMF and the WB, a number of "third world" NGOs have waged con-
certed campaigns to force policy changes by the WB and/or the IMF. 86 For
example, many of the organisations that constitute the Philippine freedom
from Debt Coalition see the WB and the IMF as principal agents behind the
policies of the Philippine government toward debt servicing, investment
and trade, and work on changing IMF and WB policies.87 Also, many In-
dian NGOs have a history of domestic activism regarding WB projects.
88
82 See P.J. Nelson, ibid at 176.
83 Ibid.
84 See J.A. Scholte, supra note 63 at 5-6.
85 Ibid at 6.
86 See P.J. Nelson, supra note 61 at 51. See also ibid at 4-5.
87 Id. at 52.
88 Id. at 52-53.
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These geo-strategic difficulties perhaps make the best case for an
attempt to embrace south-north networks based on a new framework that
ensures mutual respect, and to the extent that it is possible, shared ambi-
tions and interests.
B. Alternative and More Equal Forms of Networking
The potential practical futility of physically re-locating mass-based
"third world" struggles for legitimate governance to the foyers and grounds
of the IMF, the WB, and the UNSC, is perhaps one of the best arguments
for the construction of genuinely alternative forms of networking among
like-minds across the "third world"/western or south/north divide. It is also
one of the best arguments for the use of information technology to bridge
the geo-resource and visa gap between activists in the third world and pow-
erful institutions of governance located in the north. But in this last case, the
resource gap between north and south will almost certainly mean that only a
resort to alternative and more equal forms of networking will ensure that
the objectives of "third world" resistance campaigns will have even a re-
mote chance of success in the emerging global political economy.
The problem with this proposal for even more intensive and exten-
sive south-north networking is that it demands from "third world" activists
a faith in the capacity of northern activists to accurately give voice to their
innermost thoughts and represent adequately to the relevant international
centres of power their often peculiar perspectives and priorities. Yet this is a
doxological requirement that is not easy to justify in the face of the histori-
cal experience of the "third world" with both defunct and existing south-
north networks. For instance, a number of scholars have written of the ten-
dency of many western activists to (un)consciously substitute their own ex-
periences and priorities for those of their partner "third world" activists,
thereby assuming as inherently universal a mono-constituted experience of
suffering and resistance which is almost entirely based on their own north-
ern experience, and which is thus virtually fictional. 89 Others have written
of the tendency of western activists to exhibit paternalistic attitudes toward
"third world" activists, or to attempt to coopt them to the pursuit of a ready-
made agenda, one that was determined with little or no in-put from "third
world" activists. 90 So, for instance, the African Charter of Human and Peo-
ples Rights is all too often pilloried as not conforming to some pre-deter-
89 See for instance K. Mickelson, supra note 7 at 387; and V. Nesiah, ""Toward a
Feminist Internationality: A Critique of U.S. Feminist Legal Scholarship" (1993)
16 Harvard Women's Law Journal 192.
90 See for instance, J. Oloka-Onyango and S. Tamale, supra note.., at .... ; and
M. wa Mutua, "Ideology" supra note 54.
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mined, ready-made, conception of what a human rights treaty ought to
"look like."91 Consequently, Ogoni es for economic and social justice are
too hastily framed as basically struggles that emphasise the violation of
their civil and political rights. 92 Still others have written of the related issue
of the intellectual division of labour that characterises such north-south net-
works in which "third world" activists are all too often reduced to the posi-
tion of mindlessly applying all sorts of (mostly esoteric) theoretical
frameworks developed without reference to their own concrete historical
experience, priorities, or particularities. 93
This historically unsatisfying experience of "third world activists"
with south-north networks has brewed a fair amount of mutual suspicions
both within and among each side of the south-north intellectual divide.
However, as many "third world" and northern scholars/activists continue to
recognise, the need to network has become even more imperative in the
new political economy of this emergent millennium, and must in the end be
allowed to work.94 Such south-north intellectual/activist networks must,
however, shed their all too common tendencies toward inequality and a
non-egalitarian intellectual division of labour. Such networks must aim to-
ward a more equal kind of partnership; one that does not explicitly or im-
plicitly frame a section of the network as the core of the movement and the
"other" the periphery. None of the two sections must act as if it is itself an
establishment against which the "other" must struggle for attention and
respect. 9
5
"Third world" activists are no better served by an "establishment
leftism"96 that marginalises them and disrespects their experiences than they
91 See M. wa Mutua, "Banjul Charter" supra note 53.
92 See for instance O.C. Okafor, "International Law, Human Rights, and the Alle-
gory of the Ogoni Question" in E.K. Quashigah and O.C. Okafor, eds., Legitimate
Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 515.
93 See J. Oloka-Onyango and S. Tamale, supra note 54; and M. wa Mutua, "Ideol-
ogy" supra note 22; and B. de Sousa Santos, "Toward a Multicultural Conception
of Human Rights" (1997) 18 Zeitschriftfur Rechtssoziologie 1.
94 Ibid.
95 I am reminded of the now famous critique of the core of the critical legal stud-
ies movement by Patricia Williams' and other critical race scholars as another kind
of establishment. For example, see P. Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Reconstructed Rights" (1987) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review 412.
96 This term refers to a core left agenda advanced by an established group of
activists and scholars that brooks little dissent from their very narrow formulation
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are by any other set of policies. Both sections of the proposed south-north
network must be involved in re-authoring and re-making the core agenda
and direction of the global-level movement spawned by the network. For as
Joe Oloka-Onyango and Sylvia Tamale have put it:
".. . attempts must be made to overcome the strictures to
genuine solidarity and transnational mutual respect and
commonality. Such a process must be consciously under-
taken not only as part of the transformative challenge, but
also in the quest for cross-pollination and fertilization of
ideas and strategies. '9
7
The imperative of cautious participation or enhanced cautious par-
ticipation of "third world" activists in the relevant international institutional
processes that are the repositories of the framework governance of the
"third world," it is important to re-emphasise the enormity of the task that
such activists face simply because they originate in the "third world."
Scarce as financial resources are in the "third world," civil society groups
that originate therefrom, face the additional hurdle of access to the sites
where these institutions make the target broad policy decisions in issue;
Sites that are pre-dominantly located in extremely expensive northern cities
like Washington DC, New York and Geneva. 98 This confers a very signifi-
cant and distinct advantage on civil society groups that are based in the
north.99 As Jan Scholte has clearly articulated, "[o]ther inequalities in the
IMF-civil society dialogue have favoured associations based in the North
over groups located in the South."''0° Likewise, groups based in urban areas
(especially capital cities) have generally had greater access than groups
based in rural areas. 101 To be sure, male-dominated groups have enjoyed far
more access than women's groups. Thus, access to and participation in
these institutions is far from egalitarian. In practice, "third world" NGOs
are only able to participate if they have strong northern support. 102 Worse
still, Paul Nelson has found that Washington NGOs select which "third
world" causes to voice to and which to disregard in accordance with their
of the agenda that every progressive south-north network ought to pursue, regard-
less of the genuine differences in opinion that often exist. This reproduction of
imperialism and panopticism in an activist setting is quite troubling indeed.
97 See J. Oloka Onyango and S. Tamale, supra note 54 at 700. Emphasis supplied.
98 See P.J. Nelson, supra note 61 at 63.
99 Ibid.
1"0 See J.A. Scholte, supra note 63 at 6-7.
101 Ibid at 7.
102 See Uvin, supra note 60, at 508.
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own Washington DC priorities, the interests of their private financiers, and
the wishes of their staff! 103 This often leads to the drowning out of southern
voices. 104 Yet, many of these Washington based NGOs often claim to re-
present particular "third world" peoples, 105 and on occasion even claim to
represent these peoples more than their own governments.106 This is a phe-
nomenon which understandably irks many a "third world" leader. 107 It is
also a phenomenon which reminds us of the all too common tendency of
many northern-based activist organisations to consciously or unconsciously
silence or co-opt the agenda of its "third world" partner(s)."
While "third world" scholars/activists must remain very wary and
resist any agenda that attempts to paternalistically co-opt them, they must
also be mindful of the imperative need for them to establish alternative and
more equal forms of networks with relatively empathetic scholars/activists
in the north. Heed must be paid to this imperative if the struggles for legiti-
mate governance in "third world" states are to have a chance of signifi-
cantly influencing the workings and policies of the emergent external
repositories of the framework governance of "third world" states; be these
entities the IMF, the WB, or the UNSC. However, both "third world" and
western activists must not forget that at sustainable success depends on the
agendas and praxis that are clearly oriented to serve the genuine needs and
desires of the mass populations of "third world" states, and are not merely a
reflection of their own private desires for these masses.
C. (Continuing) Resort to Mass-Based Politics
The increasingly global nature of political economy, the relative re-
location of "third world" framework governance to places and agents exter-
nal to the relevant states (i.e. the fact that the governance of "third world"
states does not exclusively take place at the domestic level); and the conse-
quent strategic imperative of ensuring that a substantial portion of the strug-
gle for legitimate governance is effectively directed against the relevant
external repositories of the framework governance of "third world" states,
also suggest an additional strategic imperative. This imperative stems from
the logical fear that the increasing preoccupation of "third world" activists
with things global, with distantly located international institutions and ex-
ternal entities, and the consequent devotion of much of their resources to
103 Supra note 61 at 63.
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the prosecution of global-level struggles, might eventually result in the in-
creasing alienation of "third world" legitimate governance activists from the
masses of the population of "third world" states whose voices it is that they
are supposed to amplify and channel to the various sites where "third
world" governance takes place. Ultimately, this situation might even result
in a potential disjuncture between the actual demands, needs and priorities
of the masses, and the specific content of the agenda that is privileged,
prosecuted, and pursued by the very activists who ought to represent their
interests. For instance, "third world" civil society groups may soften their
position(s) just in order to seem more acceptable to the WB or the IMF, and
thus be co-opted by the agenda of the institution itself.108 Moreover, the
threat of intellectual or practical punishment for not singing the IMF or WB
tune is often real to the activist ("third world" or otherwise). For instance,
Beckman has recorded the ways in which the Structural Adjustment (SAP)
enthusiasts and WB staff have tried intently to discredit the intellectual and
activist resistance to their SAP policies. 1°9 Faced with the often high costs
of continued opposition to SAP, many a "third world" activist may "pass"
into the pro-SAP alliance. This fear is especially potent in the context of the
seductiveness of the rewards of cooperation with these entities.
One way of ensuring that these kinds of fears are not vindicated
within the context of the seemingly inexorable pursuit of more global-level
activism by "third world" activists is for such activists to resort, or continue
to resort to, a more mass-based politics. Only in this way can "third world"
legitimate governance struggles continue, against the obvious odds, to re-
flect the particular needs and aspirations of the relevant populations. Only
by ensuring, with a sense of heightened urgency, that activists retain a fun-
damental connection with the genuine yearnings of those whose lives they
seek to ultimately improve can these activists resist, with some amount of
success, the temptation of kow-towing to an array of external (but
powerfully seductive) framework governance entities that all-too-often dis-
count the need for the real pursuit of such mass-based politics. In tune with
the needs and aspirations of her or his constituency, armed with their sup-
port and encouragement, and conscious of the enormity of their often heart-
rending circumstances, the "third world" legitimate governance activist of
this emergent millennium will be better equipped to resist with success the
co-optive tendencies of the agendas and movements that currently dominate
the discourses and practices of framework or other forms of governance in
both "third world" and western states.
108 See P. Uvin, supra note 60 at 505.
109 See B. Beckman, supra note 16 at 88-92.
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This resort to a mass-based politics is also imperative for another
reason, one that has been so well stated by Wilson and Whitmore that I will
reproduce that statement in its entirety. In their view:
".. . efforts to internationalise social policy in a positive
direction must be rooted in solid work at the local and na-
tional levels, in popular sectors from which new leadership
is emerging, and in the mobilisation of political forces to
make accountable the politicians and bureaucrats who coor-
dinate their actions at the international level."110
V. CONCLUSIONS
These early moments of this millennium are a transitional moment,
a time without borders, a time for deep reflection, a time of paradigmatic
transformation; a moment that the movement for legitimate governance in
contemporary "third world" states must seize and transform for the eventual
good of all of us.1 1' It is in this context that the arguments that have been
offered in this paper and the suggestions made therein have been conceived.
These arguments were that: as we begin the new millennium, the deep
structure of "third world" governance is not just altering, but it is changing
in an increasingly fundamental way; that these changes, inter alia, for good
or for bad, involve a highly significant increase in the pace and quality of
the relative re-location of the framework governance of "third world" states
to entities that are external to these states; that a realisation of this demon-
strable externalisation of "third world" framework governance in our time
imposes an imperative on the ways in which struggles for legitimate gov-
ernance, and resistance to illegitimate governance, are most effectively con-
ceptualised and conducted; that this imperative re-conception of struggles
for legitimate governance in the "third world" ought to involve the re-loca-
tion of a lot more of the resources and energies devoted to such struggles in
ways that acknowledge and factor in the relative externalisation of "third
world" framework governance in our time; and that, if these relative ex-
ternalisations of "third world" struggles for legitimate governance is to have
an enhanced chance of bearing regular fruits, the leadership and member-
ship of these struggles must also re-conceptualise much of their strategies
110 See M.G. Wilson and E. Whitmore, "The Transnationalisation of Popular
Movements: Social Policy Making From Below" (1998) 14 Canadian Journal of
Development Studies 7 at 26.
111 See B. de Sousa Santos, "Three Metaphors for a New Conception of Law: The
Frontier, The Baroque and the South" (1995) 29 Law and Society Review 569.
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and tactics in order to reflect the breadth and depth of this changing nature
of governance and resistance in "third world" states.
Consequently, "third world" struggles for legitimate governance
ought no longer be just unilinear "descending order struggles" in which the
international community and "third world" activists struggle almost exclu-
sively against "third world" governments. Such struggles must, in addition,
become much more complicated and realistic by embracing the concepts
and practices of "ascending order struggles" for legitimate governance, in
which the very location of "third world" governance is itself questioned, in
which the relative re-location of framework governance to places and
agents external to the "third world is appreciated, in which the foregoing
imperatives are fundamentally factored into their choice of appropriate sites
of struggle and resistance, and incorporated in their conceptualisation and
operationalisation of their strategies and tactics of resistance.
In this connection, it might be instructive to re-examine not-too-
distant struggles for legitimate governance in "third world" states such as
the struggles against colonial domination in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s' 12 ,
and the struggles against neo-colonialism in the 1960s and 1970s. 113 Much
to their credit, and in spite of their recognition of the very significant and
shameful role played by internal forces, neither of these struggles dis-
counted in any appreciable measure the role of external entities in the im-
miseration of the lives of the "third world" peoples of their own time.
Neither discounted the fundamental imbrication of external institutions in
the denial of legitimate governance to "third world" peoples. Neither, to put
it succinctly, was a descending order struggle exclusively. Yet at neither of
these two historical moments was the capacity of "third world" peoples for
self-regulation as fundamentally and extensively hemmed in by an exter-
nally constructed framework governance regime as is beginning to be the
case today. This is of course not to deny the depth and breadth of the colo-
nial project in the "third world" of the late 19th and early to mid 20th centu-
ries, but to affirm that even at that time, the third world could still aspire to
effective self-governance, an aspiration that is perhaps lame today in the
context of ever-increasing and most effective appropriation of their frame-
work governance by entities external to them.
In view of this fact, what is most curious today is the extent to
which, for the most part, the leadership of mainstream "third world" strug-
gles for legitimate governance seem to have consciously or unconsciously
112 See for e.g F. Fannon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Weiden-
feld, 1967); and A. Menmmi, The Colonizer and the Colonised (New York: Orion
Press, 1965) at 120.
113 See K. Nkrumah, supra note 48.
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discounted the imperative for ascending order struggles, at precisely the
same moment that such struggles are becoming most imperative as a com-
plement to domestic legitimate governance struggles. No wonder then that
that tremendous overpowering energy of virtually instant mobilisation ex-
hibited by "third world" activists in the earlier struggles for legitimate gov-
ernance in "third world" states is all-too-often absent in today's struggles.
This call for an exhumation of the graves of past "third world" struggles for
legitimate governance in search of the transformative energy that is now
needed to move the project of "third world" legitimate governance further
along might seem like the off-shoot of romantic remembrances, of an
(un)justified valorisation of past post-colonial struggles. Regardless of the
merit of this potential accusation, which is not at all conceded, it must be
kept in mind that not every re-examination of the past is of necessity a
retrograde excursion. For after all, as Benita Parry has convincingly argued:
"Does revisiting the repositories of memory... in the cause
of post-colonial re-fashioning have a fixed retrograde va-
lency? Such censure is surely dependent on who is doing
the remembering and why...,,114
114 See B. Parry, "Resistance Theory/Theorising Resistance or Two Cheers for Na-
tivism? in F. Barker, P. Hulme and M. Iversen, eds., Colonial Discourse!
Postcolonial Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994) at 174. Em-
phasis supplied.
